The problems of the Western Alliance have not been caused by oversensitive hurt feelings and are not an appropriate subject for the kind of name-calling that has gone on both by and against the United States. That country has embarked on a timely and carefully considered strategic reorientation which is summarised in the 2025 National Security Strategy and 2026 National Defence Strategy statements and the foreign policy summary known as Project 2025. The gap that has developed is between those who have understood those documents and adjusted policy to accommodate them and those who have not.
The basis of the new American foreign policy is that the United States will defend its homeland and its interests in the Western Hemisphere and will deter China in the Indo-Pacific through a policy of strength but not antagonism or confrontation, and it will increase and reward burden-sharing with allies to enter fully into the spirit of such an association all over the world. In the 2026 National Defence Strategy, Defence Secretary Hegseth summarised these changes in the introductory paragraph, emphasising the points just named, and added: “For too long, the US government neglected – even rejected – putting Americans and their concrete interests first. Previous administrations squandered our military advantages and the lives, goodwill, and resources of our people in grandiose nation-building projects and self-congratulatory pledges to uphold cloud castle abstractions like the rules-based international order.”
The secretary asserted that this was not isolationism but an authentic strategic approach “to the threats the nation faced, based on a flexible and practical realism”. This and the other documents expressed the strongly held opinions of the Trump administration that wealthy and sophisticated allies who are capable of assuming primary responsibility for their defence should do so, and The Hague commitment of June 2025 under which NATO members pledged five per cent of GDP on defence by 2035 is stated to be the new standard for adequate participation. This and other documents promised “more favourable treatment on commercial matters, technology sharing, and defence procurement” with those countries that adjusted to these new goals. The national defence strategy explicitly promised to prioritise cooperation and engagements with model allies – those who are spending as they need to meet threats in their regions with critical but limited US support – including through arms sales, defence-industrial collaboration, intelligence sharing, and other activities that leave our nations better off. There is a clear gulf between those who responded favourably and those who have declined this policy choice.
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