How Equality Destroys a State

The equality of man is found at the forefront of our Declaration of Independence and is considered an uncontested virtue of free society.  However, disagreement over its implementation has raised the following questions: What exactly is equality in a state?  Which things should be equal?  Which should be unequal?  What are the consequences?  A nation’s concord depends on the answers — and yet today, these questions are rarely examined. 

Historically, this was not the case.  In Aristotle’s exploration in Politics, equality is governed by justice — the principle that each is given his due.  But exactly what is “due” depends on the object being distributed.  To account for this, Aristotle distinguished two types of equality: numerical, or equality of distribution, and value, or equality of proportion.  The first is characterized by each receiving the exact same, the second by each receiving an amount proportional to his contribution, ability, or merit.  

A just society requires a combination of both, each to its appropriate object.  Any misplacement of a form of equality to a domain where it doesn’t belong is an error that, if absolutized, manifests in two extremes.  The first assumes that if all are equal in one aspect, they ought to be equal in all aspects — e.g., if two people are equal in citizenship, then they should also have equal amounts of material goods or wealth.  The second supposes that if some are unequal in one aspect, they should be unequal in all aspects — e.g., different laws for different classes or levels of wealth. 

The question, then, is which aspects of society should be governed by which types.  Citizens should have numerical equality in that which is innate and belongs to man by nature itself: rights endowed by the creator, equal protection under the law, respect, and dignity.  A just state gives these things equally to everyone; they don’t require another’s physical production and are intrinsically owed by the laws of nature.  Proportional equality, however, should be owed to objects that belong to man by action and do require external production by other humans: wealth, services, and material goods.  These things are justly given in proportion to each’s contribution and merit in their acquisition, for it would not be fair for a man who contributes nothing to be owed the rewards of another man’s work.