On Christmas Day 1776, the town of Trenton, New Jersey, was no enemy-held citadel in any imposing sense. It was a winter outpost—occupied, not entrenched—held by Hessian troops who expected no determined American attack in midwinter. To their officers, serving the British Crown, Trenton appeared a suitable place to settle in for the season, perhaps longer, while the rebellion around them seemed to be quietly expiring.
I have previously written about the precarious situation facing Washington and the Continental Army in December 1776, including the crisis posed by expiring enlistments and the dangers of the Delaware crossing. What mattered next was how Washington translated this peril into bold and decisive action.
His original conception was deliberate and sound. Washington did not intend a simple raid. His own force would cross the Delaware north of Trenton and strike directly.
A second column under Colonel John Cadwalader was to cross at Dunk’s Ferry to the south, applying pressure and preventing reinforcement. A third, under Brigadier General James Ewing, was to cross at Trenton Ferry and seize the bridge over the Assunpink Creek, blocking escape.
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